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1. Introduct ion 
In the standard model of the family, all members of the family jointly maximize a 
common objective function. This is because members are altruistic to each other, or because 
of the Rotten Kid Theorem of Becker (1981) that selfish members find it to their self 
interest to conform to the altruist's objective. The model has a strong neutrality implication 
that consumption is invariant to how resources are divided within the family as long as total 
family resources are controlled for. For the U.S., neutrality does not seem an adequate 
description of household behavior. Using data on individual households linked by parent-
child relation, Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992) have shown that the allocation of 
consumption across households forming a single family is closely related to division of 
income within the family. It would be interesting to see if neutrality fares better in other 
cultures that appear to value family ties. The purpose of this paper is to test neutrality for 
Japan. 
Although there is no Japanese data on households linked by relation, a substantial 
fraction of a cross-section of Japanese households are extended families or two-generation 
households in which two adult generations co-reside. Since consumption data are for the 
household as a whole, it is not possible to study the allocation of total household consump-
tion within two-generation households. Still, neutrality has an implication that, for each 
commodity, the household's total demand is invariant to division of resources between co-
residing generations. We test this demand neutrality by checking whether a demand system, 
1. According to the 1984 Basic Survey of Welfare Administration (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 
Government of Japan), p. 92, about 63% of all individuals 60 years or older in Japan live with their 
children. 
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which in a cross-section of households is a collection of Engel curves, is affected by 
intergenerational division of resources. Demand would also be neutral if co-residing 
generations had identical tastes. However, it can be documented from data on Japanese 
nuclear households that food taste is very much generational. 
If co-residence is a result of a residence status choice made by parent and child who 
could have lived separately as two separate nuclear households, the sample of two-generation 
households is a choice-based sample. Correcting the sample selection bias is very difficult, 
because nuclear households contained in our data set are not linked by relation, providing 
no information on the characteristics of parent-child pairs that chose living apart over co-
residence. Consequently, we ignore the sample selection bias in our estimation of Engel 
curves. This is probably innocuous, because the Engel curves we estimate are for a subset 
of commodities (food). We will provide in section 4 an example in which the endogeneity 
of the residence status does not bias parameter estimates of Engel curves. 
The idea of testing whether demand is neutral is not new. There is a literature on 
the invariance of demand to division of resources between spouses. However, a typical 
testing procedure is to see if non-earned income of husband and wife has the identical effect 
on demand, with no attempt to control for total resources. If, for exardple, husband's 
income is more permanent than wife's, then under neutrality husband's income should have 
more weight for demand because it is more closely related to total resources. Our Engel 
curve-based test does not have this problem because total consumption expenditure in Engel 
curves serves as a perfect control for the household's total resources. Also, to our knowl-
2. See, e.g., Cai (1989), Schultz (1990), and Thomas (1990). 
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edge this paper is a first attempt to test neutrality of household demand to intergenerational 
distribution, which, from the viewpoint of macroeconomics, would be more interesting than 
testing neutrality within generations. 
The content of the paper is as follows. In the next section, section 2, we briefly 
describe the Japanese cross-section data set of about fifty thousand households, more than 
one-fifth of which are two-generation households. Section 3 documents some stylized facts 
about determinants of co-residence and the generational difference in food tastes. In section 
4 we examine altruistic models of the residence status and make precise the sense neutrality 
entails on two-generation households in these models. We also provide a parametric 
example which is capable of explaining the stylized facts about co-residence and in which 
the sample selection bias for Engel curves does not exist. Section 5 present our Engel curve-
based test of demand neutrality. Section 6 contains a few concluding remarks. 
2. The Data 
The data we utilize is the 1984 wave of the National Survey of Family Income and 
Expenditure (NSFIE) conducted by the Japanese government every five years since 1959. We 
briefly describe the aspects of the data relevant to the present study; a detailed description 
and evaluation of the data can be found in Hayashi, Ando and Ferris (1988). The survey 
consists of two cross-section data sets: about four thousand singles and about fifty thousand 
non-singles households. The sampling ratio differs between singles and non-singles as well 
as between geographical regions. O n average, singles are under-represented by a factor of 
three. Respondents are required to keep a diary on hundreds of expenditure and receipt 
items throughout the three-month period of the survey from September to November (for 
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singles in 1984, the survey is for September only). In the last month of the survey, the 
respondent reports information on the household's financial assets, consumer durables, and 
annual income for the latest 12-month period. Each income component (e.g., employment 
income, interest and dividend income) is broken down by household member, but the 
breakdown is rather coarse: "head", "spouse", and "all other household members", where 
"head" is defined to be the main income earner. 
A very important fact about Japanese households, which is well reflected in the data, 
is the prevalence of two-generation households (extended families). For reasons to be made 
clear in the next paragraph, we take a rather narrow definition of a two-generation house-
hold. Define an adult to be an individual who is either working, 25 years or older, married, 
or the head of a singles household, and a generation to be either a married couple or an 
unmarried adult. If the generation is a couple, its age is the average age of the couple. We 
define a two-generation household to be a household of two generations sharing the same 
budget, one of which is the father, mother, or both, of the other generation, such that: (1) 
the older generation be 55 or older while the younger generation be less than 55 years of 
age, (2) there be no other adults, and (3) the older generation have no non-adult co-residing 
children. Accordingly, a nuclear household is a generation with or without non-adult co-
residing children. Thus singles are a nuclear household. A nuclear household is either a 
young nuclear household whose generation is younger than 55, or an old nuclear household 55 
or older. We require, in line with the definition of two-generation households, that old 
nuclear households have no non-adult co-residing children. 
We adopt the age requirement (requirement (1) above) so that we can compare 
generations living with their offspring with those living alone; any generation 55 or older 
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is either in the pool of old nuclear households or the older generation of a two-generation 
household. Similarly, any generation younger than 55 is either in the pool of young nuclear 
households or the younger generation of a two-generation household. We will exploit this 
facet of the data to study the choice of residence status (live alone or co-reside) for the old 
and the young. Requirement (2) is dictated by the coarse breakdown of household income 
by member mentioned above. We will equate the income of the non-head generation with 
that of "all other household members". If there were other adults in the two-generation 
household, the non-head generation's income thus identified would include their income as 
well. Requirement (3) is adopted for convenience and simplicity. There are very few old 
generations that have non-adult co-residing children in the data. For the same reason we 
ignore three-adult generation households. 
Figure 1 should make it clear how we create three samples — two-generation 
households, young nuclear households, and old nuclears — from two raw data sets (one on 
singles and the other on non-singles). Elimination of cases with officially designated missing 
values for relevant variables reduces the data set size to 3,924 for singles and 47,393 for non-
singles. These 51,317 (= 3,924 + 47,393) records are directed to 32,266 nuclear, 12,265 two-
generation, and 6,786 other households. After the application of the age requirement and 
the requirement that the older generation have no non-adult children, there are 26,498 
young nuclear, 5,538 old nuclear, and 10,068 two-generation households. Using the survey's 
definition of the head (the main income earner), we can further divide the sample of two-
generation households into two parts: those whose head is the older generation (3,386 
households) and those whose head is the younger generation (remaining 6,682 households). 
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3. Stylized Facts 
Sample means of selected variables for the three samples are displayed in Table 1. 
For two-generation households, household income can be divided between the two genera-
tions, while expenditures are for the household as a whole. Income and expenditures are 
as in the raw data, with no modifications and imputations to make them conformable to 
national income accounts definitions.3 The sample means in the table are weighted by the 
sampling weights provided by the survey (see notes to Table 1 for more details). 
The following are the noteworthy points about the table. 
(1) Comparison of the sample size and the estimated population size for old nuclear and 
two-generation households confirms that the majority of old individuals live with their 
children. 
(2) The old generation's marital status does not depend heavily on the residence status, 
although widows are somewhat more likely to be in two-generation households. 
(3) On the other hand, the old generation's income depend on the residence status: it is less 
for those co-residing with offspring. This is partly due to the high fraction of the old in 
two-generation households reporting zero income (see line 10). As discussed in Appendix, 
there is reason to believe that some of them are false zeros, i.e., missing cases with positive 
income mis-coded as zeros. However, also as discussed in Appendix, the extent of possible 
mis-coding is probably not enough to alter the conclusion. The same is true for the young, 
albeit to a much less degree. 
3. A detailed discussion of how the raw data should be adjusted to national income accounts defini-
tions and for under-reporting can be found in Hayashi et. al. (1989). 
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(4) The incidence of annual private monetary transfer receipts (see line 12) for two-genera-
tion households are low because transfers between parents and children are internal and 
hence not recorded. For young nuclear households, the annual transfer incidence of 5% (see 
line 13) is much less than the annual incidence reported for the U.S. of about 20%. On 
the other hand, the average transfer amount among those who received transfers is a much 
larger fraction of their income for Japan than for the U.S. 
(5) There is a substantial difference in the pattern of food expenditure between young and 
old nuclear households.5 The young prefer "western" staples such as meat and dairy 
products while the old spend a higher fraction of food budget on cereal, fish, and vegetables. 
Somewhere in the middle lies the food expenditure pattern of two-generation households. 
Whether this food pattern is influenced by division of resources within two-generation 
households is the main question to be addressed in the paper. 
Another noteworthy fact about two-generation households is that the older 
generation's income is negatively correlated with the younger generation's, as shown in 
Figure 2. The correlation for pairs reporting positive values is -0.12. If false zeros were 
identified and taken into the calculation, the negative correlation would have been stronger. 
To explore factors determining the residence status, we estimated a Probit co-
residence equation. Since we have no information for nuclear families on variables pertain-
4. See Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1992,1993) (which uses the NLS (National Longitudinal Survey)), and 
Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1993) and Ioannides and Kan (1993) (which use the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics). 
5. Of course this could be due to differences in demographics and income. We will show that the 
strong age effect remains even after controlling for those factors by estimating Engel curves on the 
sample of nuclear families in section 5. 
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ing to the parents or adult children of the head, we have to deviate from the more desirable 
specification of including both parents' and offspring's labor incomes. We instead estimate 
the co-residence equation separately for the young and the old. The dependent variable 
takes a value of 0 (living apart) if the observation is from nuclear households and 1 (co-
residence) if from two-generation households. Thus the sample size is 36,566 (= 26,498 + 
10,068) for the young and 15,606 (= 5,538 + 10,068) for the old. To control for the 
possible mis-coding that produced many zero incomes, we include a zero income dummy 
for the relevant income component as an independent variable. 
Column 1 of Table 2 reports the co-residence equation for the young. The base for 
the marital dummy variables is couples, so that, for example, the positive coefficient on the 
dummy for single males imply that single males are more likely to co-reside with parents 
than couples. The number of non-adult children of the younger generation and the working 
wife dummy have positive coefficients, most likely due to the child care services provided 
by co-residing parents. Even after the effect of zero income is controlled for, income has 
a negative effect on co-residence. The corresponding co-residence equation for the old is 
in column 2 of the table. The negative effect of income on co-residence is highly significant 
for the old, particularly for pension income, which is consistent with the view that the 
development of social security has contributed to the decline of extended families.7 The 
negative coefficient on capital income reported in column 3 of the table means that those 
6. This is consistent with the studies by Kotlikoff and Morris (1990) and by Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(1993) for the U.S. Because they were able to match parents with children in their data sets, their co-
residence equation has both the parent's and child's income. Both incomes have negative coefficients. 
7. See, e.g., Soldo and Lauriat (1976). 
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with high bequeathable wealth tend to live apart from children. 
We also estimated a monetary transfer receipts equation by Tobit. Unlike the co-
residence equation, the sample excludes two-generation households because most monetary 
transfers are internal for two-generation households. As in the co-residence equation, 
variables pertaining to the other generation are not included. Capital income is excluded 
to avoid endogeneity bias. The Tobit estimates reported in Table 3 show that labor income 
has a negative and highly significant effect on transfer receipts. Its magnitude is much larger 
for the young, perhaps because transfer from parents is timed to alleviate liquidity con-
straints. The coefficient on the number of non-adult children implies that an additional 
child increases transfer receipts by 300 thousand yen per year.10 
4. Altruistic Models of Co-residence 
In this section we will examine models of co-residence in which an altruistic family, 
consisting of a parent generation (P) and its offspring (K), chooses between living apart to 
form two separate nuclear households and co-residence in a two-generation household, and 
show that demand neutrality — invariance of consumption demand to division of resources 
within families — holds for families choosing co-residence. We will also argue that neutrali-
8. These results are in sharp contrast to those in Ohtake (1992), which reports for a different sample 
of Japanese households that bequeathable wealth has a positive effect on co-residence while the effect 
of pension income is insignificant. Due to data limitations, the form of co-residence he considered 
is the so-called quasi-residence which is that the two generations live under the same roof but do not 
share a common budget. Our result about the effect of bequeathable wealth is consistent with Ando 
and Kennickell (1987) using the 1974 and 1979 wave of the NSFIE. 
9. Cox and Jappelli (1990) shows for the U.S. that private transfers are targeted to those that are 
liquidity constrained. 
10. This is consistent with the results from the NLS that the number of children increases the 
incidence of transfer receipts. See Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1992). 
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ty is unlikely to hold if the two generations are not altruistic. 
5.1. Housing as a Public Good 
The family wishes to maximize 
where u; is generation i's own utility function (i = P,K), hj is housing services, £j an 
unobservable taste shifter, q a non-housing consumption vector, and r is the residence 
status (live apart or co-reside) which affects the utility functions. When the two generations 
live apart, the budget constraints for two separate nuclear households are combined through 
monetary transfers into a single constraint 
where yj is generation i's income, p is the non-housing consumption price vector, and 
q is the price of housing services. When they live together to form a single two-generation 
household, housing is a public good. The budget constraint is 
(4.3) p ' (cP + CK) + qh = y P + yK , 
where h is the common housing consumption. The family chooses the residence status 
that yields higher family utility. 
For later use, we note that the family's problem in the case of co-residence can be 
expressed as follows. The family's induced preferences over total consumption are give by: 
So the family's problem is to maximize the induced family utility subject to the budget 
constraint p ' c + qh = yp + y^. This way of looking at the problem is useful because we 
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do not observe individual consumption vector (cp, c&) — all we observe is total consump-
tion c — for two-generation households. 
The model has a neutrality property: given total family resources (in this static model 
represented by y = yp + y&), consumption demand does not depend on how total family 
resources are divided within the family. To be more precise, neutrality for two-generation 
households has two parts. The first is demand neutrality. As clear from the discussion of 
the induced utility (4.4), the arguments of household demand function include prices, total 
consumption expenditure (which in this static model coincides with y by the budget 
constraint), and taste shifters, but not division of total resources. The second is the 
neutrality of residence status choice: the choice is a function of taste shifters and total 
resources (0, £p, £&, y) but not of division of total resources. Since the residence status 
choice is endogenous, there is a sample selection bias in that the distribution of taste shifters 
entering the demand function for two-generation households is already conditional on co-
residence. An implication of the neutrality of residence status choice is that the conditional 
distribution does not depend on individual resources as long as it is conditional on total 
resources. 
4.2. An Example 
To illustrate these points, consider the following log-linear example, which also can 
explain the stylized facts about the relationship between co-residence and income document-
ed in the previous section. The utility function is 
where X(live apart) = 1 while X(co-residence) = X < 1, to reflect the disutility of co-
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residence arising from the loss of privacy. Let v;(.) be such that its indirect utility function 
takes the following Gorman polar form:11 
where x- is nominal expenditure on non-housing consumption; this x^  should replace the 
p ' q in the budget constraints (4.2) and (4.3). The taste shifter, £•, has two elements (T/J, 
X). It is easy to show that the family chooses co-residence if and only if y < y*, where 
the threshold income level y* is given by 
Note that the taste shock 77- does not affect the residence status because its effect on family 
utility does not depend on the residence status. 
The induced family utility (4.4) in terms of non-housing expenditure and housing 
consumption for two-generation households becomes 
where x = xp + xK is total non-housing expenditure and log(a(p, 7?p, T/K)) « 0log(a(p, Tjp)) 
4- (l-#)log(aK(p, ??K))- Thus the strong separability between housing and non-housing 
consumptions that we assumed for individual utility functions is preserved. 
The share of housing expenditure, qh/(x + qh), equals Xb(p), which does not involve 
division of resources, verifying demand neutrality. The taste shifter entering the share 
11. Particular parameterizations of this Gorman polar form include the Translog model of 
Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1975) and the Almost Identical Demand System of Deaton and 
Muelbauer (1980). The b(p) in (4.6) can depend on the generation but it complicates the calculation 
without affecting the points to be made. 
12. The <f> function in (4.7) is: -[01og(0) + (l-0)log(l-0)]/(l-X) - log(b) + Xlog(X)/X - [(l + bX)log(l + bX) 
- (l + b)log(l + b)]/0»(l-X)). 
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equation is X. Its mean conditional on co-residence, y, and any indicator, say d, of 
division of y does not depend on d because E(X| co-residence, y, d) - E(X| y < y*, y, 
Clearly, this example can explain why income is lower for generations who co-reside 
(see stylized fact (3) in the previous section), and why either generation's income has the 
negative effect in the Probit co-residence equation of Table 2: unless yp and y K are 
strongly negatively correlated, Pr(y < y* | y j ) decreases with y^. It also explains the 
negative correlation shown in Figure 2, because the correlation between yp and y K 
conditional on co-residence (i.e., conditional on yp + y^ < y*) can be negative even if the 
unconditional correlation is positive. Finally, that the threshold income y* increases with 
housing costs (q) is consistent with the prevalence of co-residence in a high housing price 
country like Japan. 
4.3. Time Transfers 
We have supposed that the benefit from co-residence is returns to scale in housing. 
Is neutrality specific to how we model the costs and benefits of co-residence? Another 
plausible reason for co-residence is the ease of time transfers. To focus on time transfers, 
consider the following altruistic model: 
where T is time endowment, t-j- (i = P,K) is time spent by generation i with the other 
generation, t • is leisure, w^ is the wage rate, and 5(r) is an (inverse) efficiency index of 
time transfer which equals 1 if r = co-residence and 5 (> 1) if r = live apart. 
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The induced family utility given the residence status r is given by 
where n- (i - P,K) is labor supply or hours worked. The family's problem conditional on 
co-residence is to maximize (4.10) subject to p ' c - wpnp + wKnK , which makes it clear 
that demand neutrality is conditional on hours worked: household demand c is invariant 
to individual wages, given prices, taste shifters, total consumption expenditure p ' c , and 
hours worked.13 However, the residence status choice now depends on individual wages, 
thanks to the price effects of wages on hours worked. 
4.4. Non-altruistic Models of Co-residence 
Is neutrality a hallmark of altruism? To be sure, altruism is not a prerequisite for 
co-residence; models of co-residence for two selfish agents wishing to share benefits from co-
residence can readily be found from the literature on marriage. In the Nash cooperative 
bargaining models of marriage,14 the equilibrium is assumed to be Pareto efficient. So 
consumption maximizes the weighted utility (4.1) for some 0. The difference from the 
altruistic model is that the weight 8 depends on division of total resources because so does 
the threat point. Therefore, neutrality would not hold for non-altruistic models of co-
residence that assume Pareto efficiency. 
One can view the model of non-cooperative provision of a public good as a non-
13. If consumption c is weakly separable from hours worked in the induced utility function, or if 
hours worked are the same across households, as in the model of section 4.1, then demand neutrality 
is unconditional on hours worked. 
14. See the literature cited in Behrman (1992). 
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cooperative model of co-residence with housing being the public good. Warr (1983) and 
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) have shown that consumption is invariant to division 
of resources if both agents make strictly positive donations to the public good. However, 
their result should be interpreted with care. First, the pairs of agents who play the public 
goods game may be self-selected and the selection may depend on individual incomes. 
Second, as Lundberg and Pollak (1993a) note, corner solutions are plausible in the case of 
multiple public goods. Third, one can question whether the one-shot non-cooperative 
approach is appropriate for modeling the parent-child relationship.15 
5. Testing Neutral i ty 
5.1. Specification of Engel Curves 
As seen in the previous section, neutrality implies that the system of demand 
functions for two-generation households do not involve any indicator of how total resources 
are divided between two generations. In cross-section data with common prices to all 
households, demand functions are Engel curves. We test neutrality by including intra-
household division indicators in Engel curves and checking for their significance in these 
augmented Engel curves. In order to implement the test, we have to address four issues. 
The first issue is treatment of durables. The total consumption expenditure in Engel 
curves includes service flows from durables. But there is evidence from a separate Japanese 
micro data that all commodities except food are (psychologically) durable.16 For such 
15. Lundberg and Pollak (1993b) show that neutrality does not hold in a repeated game context. 
16. See Hayashi (1985). His estimate of the depreciation rate for recreational expenditure is 5% per 
year. 
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commodities it is impossible to calculate service flows because there is no information on 
cumulative expenditures. We avoid this difficulty by assuming that food is weakly separable 
from other commodities in the induced family utility and focus on the allocation of food 
expenditure among food components. Weak separability will be tested below. 
The second issue is treatment of hours worked. Lacking information on hours 
worked and wage rates, we are too constrained to provide a completely satisfactory treat-
ment here. Available evidence (see Browning and Meghir (1991) for the U.K.) is that hours 
worked and food are not weakly separable, and indeed in our data when employment status 
is included in Engel curves it is statistically significant. Thus food demand must be condi-
tioned on hours worked, as in section 4.3, but we do not have valid instruments such as 
wage rates for hours worked in our data. Thus, we are forced to make an untestable assump-
tion that hours worked are exogenous. Furthermore, hours worked will be proxied by two 
dummy variables for work and part-time work. 
Third, food expenditure, being a function of taste shifters, is an endogenous variable 
which we instrument by the household's (current) income, its square, capital income, its 
square, and net financial assets. Under the assumption that hours worked are exogenous, 
both capital income and labor income (which is part of current income) are valid instru-
ments. 
Fourth and most important, we have to deal with the possible sample selection bias. 
Since the distribution of unobservable taste shifters entering Engel curves as the errer term 
for two-generation households is already conditional on co-residence, the error term may 
be correlated with instruments (e.g., income) that affect the residence status choice. 
Correcting the bias is very difficult. The standard Heckit procedure is infeasible here 
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because our sample of nuclear households are not linked by relation, providing no informa-
tion on the characteristics of families having chosen living apart. Thus we are forced to 
ignore the sample selection bias. This is less onerous than it sounds, since the Engel curves 
we estimate are only a sub-system of demand functions. In fact, in the example given in 
section 4.2, the taste shifters entering non-housing demand, )/p and 77K, do not enter the 
residence status choice, so there exists no sample selection bias, provided that 7?p and ?jK 
are independent of the taste shifters that do enter the residence status choice. Also, if the 
error term in Engel curves are dominated by measurement error, no bias arises. 
5.2. Engel Curves for Nuclear Households 
Before proceeding to test the hypothesis, we document that there is a substantial 
intergenerational difference in tastes for food by estimating Engel curves for nuclear 
households, which may also be of independent interest. The form of Engel curves we 
entertain permits some functional flexibility: 
where xM is the Box-Cox transform, x is nominal food expenditure for the household 
in question, z is a vector of demographics (including age) and employment status for the 
household, S: is the share (in percents) of the j-th food component in food budget, and rj-
is the error term. Following Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1989), we try three values 
for y: y = 1, 0 , -1 . If p is the price vector, the Engel curves (5.1) can be derived from the 
indirect utility function [x/a(p)P*7vb(p), which reduces to the indirect (sub)utility function 
17. For example, if the explanatory variable in the Probit selection equation is income, we need for 
limit observations (families whose residence status choice is live apart) the sum of parent's income and 
child's income. 
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in section 4.2 when 7 = 0, quasi-homothetic preferences when 7 = -1 , and quadratic Engel 
curves when 7 = l.18 As in Table 1, we divide food into six food components: cereal, 
fish, meat & dairies, vegetables, eating out, and other food. 
We assume that the error term is conditionally homoskedastic because parameter 
estimates under the more general case of conditional heteroskedasticity are very similar. 
Then, since both the instruments and the right-hand-side variables are the same across 
equations, the three-stage least squares reduces to the two-stage least squares. Table 4 reports 
the two-stage least squares estimation of the five equation system for the sample of 32,036 
nuclear households (26,498 young nuclear plus 5,538 old nuclear households). The Engel 
curve for the sixth food component, other food, is dropped because it is a linear combina-
tion of the first five Engel curves. 
Panel A of the table shows parameter estimates for the log case (7 = 0); those for 
7 = 1 or -1 are similar and not reported here. The results accord very well with our a 
priori expectations. Cereal is more important for households with children perhaps because 
of their higher calory needs. The share of eating out depends heavily on wife's employment 
status and increases with food expenditure. The substantial reduction in the residual 
variation for eating out is mostly due to the sample's inclusion of singles which tend to eat 
out much more frequently. More importantly, the household's age very strongly affects 
budget shares. The old spend more on cereal, fish, and vegetables, and less on eating out. 
We computed several diagnostics statistics, some of which are reported in Panel B. 
18. For y = -1, the shape of (5.1) depends on how x is scaled. We deflate food expenditure x by 
its sample mean. 
19. The Hausman exogeneity test is not reported here because the test statistic was extremely large 
or (less frequently) negative. In particular, the OLS estimate of the coefficient of x'7> is very different 
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The Sargan statistic for the five equation system is highly significant. This may not be 
totally surprising given the very large sample size. To test weak separability, we added the 
same Box-Cox transform of medical expenditure to the share equations, treating it as 
endogenous.21 The Wald statistic for joint significance in the five equations is fairly large, 
but not overwhelmingly so. 
In sum, despite some evidence of mis-specification, our estimation of Engel curves 
for nuclear households has served our purpose: it unambiguously confirms the very strong 
effect of age on the structure of food demand. 
5.3. Engel Curves for Two-Generation Households 
We now turn to the sample of two-generation households to test neutrality. We use 
the same form of Engel curves (5.1), with the z vector now including demographics and 
employment statuses of two generations. We use two indicators of intra-household division 
of resources: parent's share of household income, yp/(yp + yx) (where yp and y K are 
parent's and child's current incomes) and the dummy that parents are the head of house-
hold. Under the maintained hypothesis that labor supply is exogenous, parent's income 
share can be treated as exogenous. The household head dummy is also exogenous because 
from the two-stage least squares estimate; the log food coefficient in the share equation for cereal, for 
example, is -3.2. 
20. The Sargan statistic for the system is calculated as: e' ( S ' ^ X p t ' X)_1X)e where e' = (exf, ..., e5 '), 
e: is the residual vector from the j-th equation, X is the matrix of instruments, and S is the 5x5 
residual covariance matrix. The degrees of freedom are 20 because the number of instruments exceeds 
that of the right-hand-side variables by 4 in each equation. 
21. We also tried total nondurables expenditure (total expenditure less durables) instead of medical 
expenditure to test weak separability, but because of a serious multicollinearity between food and 
nondurables the parameter estimates were imprecise and the test was inconclusive. 
22. Parent's share of household capital income is also tried, but because of numerous cases with zeros, 
it was not significant. Hayashi et. al. (1988) argues that capital income in the NSFIE is severely under-
reported. 
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the head is defined as the main income earner. Thus the complete set of instruments is: 
demographics and employment statuses for two generations, household income, its square, 
household capital income, its square, net financial assets, and the two resource division 
indicators. 
Table 5 presents results from our estimation of augmented Engel curves. Again, the 
parameter estimates are not very sensitive to the value of 7 in the Box-Cox transform, so 
in Panel A we present relevant coefficients for the log case (where 7 = 0). In four of the 
five equations, either indicator comes out strongly. The Wald statistic for the hypothesis 
that the coefficients of the two indicators are zero in all five equations, also reported in 
Panel A of the table, implies that demand neutrality can be rejected rather decisively. 
Furthermore, the coefficients's sign pattern accords with the age effect shown in Table 4 for 
nuclear households: the expenditure share rises with parent's share of household resources 
precisely for food components favored by the old. 
The Sargan statistic, reported in Panel B of the table, is fairly significant, possibly 
because the effect of intra-household division of resources is not fully captured by the two 
indicators which are here assumed to affect food demand additively. To check whether the 
significance of the indicators is due to the failure of weak separability, we add to each 
equation the corresponding Box-Cox transform of medical expenditure and treat it as 
endogenous. As the Wald statistic for its joint significance in the system attests, weak 
separability cannot be rejected. The two indicators of parent's share of resources remain 
highly significant even when medical expenditure is included. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
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A hallmark of altruism is the neutrality property that consumption is invariant of 
division to resources within the family. When applied to two-generation households, it 
implies that the demand system should not be affected by intergenerational division of 
resources. We were able to reject this neutrality implication since expenditure on precisely 
the food items favored by old generation is found to be sensitive to the older generation's 
share of household income. 
The rejection of neutrality, however, does not necessarily mean a complete lack of 
altruism between parents and children. What it does mean is that there is a conflict between 
parents and children as to what the family's objective ought to be. There seems no question 
that children is altruistic toward parents albeit imperfectly; otherwise we would not see 
children co-residing with parents with very low income, as observed in our data. One could 
argue that co-residence is a manifestation of income risk-sharing. However, parent may have 
been poor before child is born. Even if parent and child can agree to a contract before 
observing income, it is difficult to explain why child provides help when parent is poor, 
despite the absence of enforcement. 
Evidence against neutrality presented in this paper for Japan and in Altonji et. al. 
(1992) for the U.S. casts serious doubts on the empirical basis for the view that generations 
act as if they form a single immortal dynasty. 
23. A caveat: it is possible that children living with apparently very poor parents are doing so because 
the parent was able to offer a house to live. 
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Appendix: Possible Mis-coding of Missing Cases 
For two-generation households, there is clear evidence that genuine missing values are 
sometimes mis-coded as zeros. It is known that about 90% of two-generation households (with 
non-adult children) in which at least one individual 60 years or older is present received public 
pension in 1984.24 Table 6 reports the old generation's pension income for old nuclear 
households (Panel A), heads in two-generation households (Panel B)3 and non-heads in two-
generation households (Panel C). Thus the income of the old in Panel C is that of "all other 
household members". The fraction receiving positive pension income is somewhat lower in 
Panel B than in Panel A most likely because the old in Panel B are active people, still maintain-
ing the household head status despite the presence of adult children co-residing in the same 
household. On the other hand, the old in Panel C are no longer head and are likely to be 
retired. That the fraction of them receiving positive pension income is much less can only be 
explained by a confusion of missing cases with zeros. Perhaps in many instances the respondent 
(usually the spouse of the head), unaware of the existence of the parents' pension income, left 
the relevant box in the questionnaire blank, which was officially coded as a zero. Many of these 
official zeros are undoubtedly genuine zeros, and true pension income for the rest of the official 
zeros is likely to be low. Furthermore, as reported in the table, the mean pension income for 
those reporting a positive value is lower for the old in two-generation households, particularly 
for non-heads. Therefore, it is highly likely that the true mean of pension income is substantial-
ly lower for the old in two-generation households than for old nuclear households. 
24. Ministry of Health and Welfare, ibid., p. 102. 
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